

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2791

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO JCS

CINCPAC

MAAG TAIPEI

COMUSTDC TAIPEI

327TH AD TAIPEI

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TAIPEI 5430

CINCPAC AND CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: MASS, MCAP, PFOR, TW

SUBJ: US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ROC

1. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING TELEGRAM IN PART ONE SETS FORTH
SUGGESTED RESTATEMENT OF BASIS FOR US SECURITY ASSISTANCE
TO ROC. PART TWO ASSESSES MAJOR NEAR TERM ROC WEAPONS SYSTEM
REQUIREMENTS IN LIGHT OF THESE CRITERIA, AND NOTES IMPORTANCE
OF EARLY EVALUATION BY MISSION OF ALL MAJOR ROC EQUIPMENT
REQUESTS (SEE PARA 20) REGARDLESS OF ORIGINATING CHANNEL. END SUMMARY
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2. PART ONE. THE PROBLEM: IN THE PAST, US SECURITY
ASSISTANCE TO THE ROC HAS BEEN BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF
MAINTAINING ROC DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN ORDER: (A)
TO HELP DETER AN ATTACK FROM THE PRC; AND (B) IF SUCH AN
ATTACK SHOULD COME, TO GIVE THE US TIME TO ASSESS THE
SITUATION AND TAKE APPROPRIATE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY

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ACTION, HAVING IN MIND THE PROVISIONS OF THE BILATERAL

SECURITY TREATY.

3. THIS CONCEPT IS BECOMING A LESS EFFECTIVE GUIDE TO SELECTING APPROPRIATE WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR THE ROC ARMED FORCES:

--DETERRENCE TODAY IS INCREASINGLY POLITICAL, RATHER THAN MILITARY, AND AS SUCH IT OPERATES LARGELY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF US-PRC NORMALIZATION.

--PRC PROGRESS IN WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT INCREASINGLY IS MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ROC ARMED FORCES TO MATCH THOSE OF THE PRC IN ALL WEAPONS AREAS. THERE ARE BOUND TO BE CERTAIN PRC WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR WHICH THE ROC WILL HAVE NO COUNTER, OR WHICH IT CAN COUNTER ONLY BY SKEWING ITS TOTAL MILITARY POSTURE.

--THE VIEWS OF NON-MILITARY OFFICIALS OR OF THE PUBLIC (WHETHER IN THE PRC, US, OR ROC) OF CERTAIN WEAPONS SYSTEMS SOMETIMES OBSCURES THEIR REAL FUNCTION, THEIR TRUE EFFECTIVENESS, OR THE NATURE OF THE THREAT THEY POSE, YET IS A FACTOR WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

4. A NEW DOCTRINE: THE PRC MILITARY CAPABILITIES WHICH POSE THE MOST DISCERNIBLE THREAT TO THE ROC ARE AN AERIAL BOMBARDMENT CAMPAIGN, SEABORNE INVASION, AND/OR SEA-AIR BLOCKADE. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A SECURITY ASSISTANCE DOCTRINE WHICH IN EVERY CASE OR AUTOMATICALLY WILL INDICATE WHICH WEAPONS SYSTEMS ARE APPROPRIATE AND WHICH INAPPROPRIATE. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE SUGGESTING BELOW CONCEPTS WHICH WILL AID IN REACHING SUCH DECISIONS AND WHICH ARE MORE RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. BASICALLY, IN PROVIDING SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE ROC WE SHOULD BE MINDFUL THAT:

(A) FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETERRENCE WILL CONTINUE TO REST PRIMARILY UPON THE US, RATHER THAN THE ROC, BUT WILL BE INCREASINGLY POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY IN NATURE EVEN THOUGH BASED ON PRC APPRECIATION OF US ABILITY TO RESPOND MILITARILY.

(B) THE ABILITY OF THE ROC ARMED FORCES TO EXACT A SIGNIFICANT PRICE IN THE EVENT OF A PRC ATTACK CONTINUES
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TO BE AN IMPORTANT, THOUGH LESSER, ASPECT OF THE TOTAL DETERRENT.

(C) EVEN AT THIS LOWER LEVEL, THE ROC MILITARY POSTURE MUST APPEAR CREDIBLE IN THE EYES OF THE ROC, THE ROC PUBLIC AND THE PRC LEADERSHIP.

5. IMPLICATIONS: THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS SEEM TO

FLOW LOGICALLY FROM THE ABOVE:

--CONSTRAINTS AGAINST PRC MILITARY ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN ARE BUILT INTO THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE US-PRC RELATIONSHIP THROUGHOUT THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS AND BEYOND.

--IT IS NOT PRACTICAL TO THINK IN TERMS OF BRINGING THE ROC ARMED FORCES TO THE POINT WHERE THEY CAN DEFEAT AN ALL-OUT PRC ATTACK WITHOUT OUTSIDE (I.E. US) ASSISTANCE, BUT THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES LONG ENOUGH TO BUY SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE US TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY, IF IT DECIDES TO ACT. SOMETHING ANALOGOUS TO SINGAPORE'S "HEDGEHOG" CONCEPT IS INDICATED.

--THE ROC MUST APPEAR IN BOTH ITS OWN AND PRC EYES TO HAVE THE ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY RESIST, OR AT LEAST EXACT A HEAVY PRICE IN THE EVENT OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT FOLLOWED BY SEA-BORNE INVASION.

--TENSIONS IN THE REGION WILL HEIGHTEN CONSIDERABLY IF THE PRC FEELS ITSELF THREATENED FROM TAIWAN. THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH THE ROC NEED NOT AND SHOULD NOT ACQUIRE A COUNTERING WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR EACH AND EVERY PRC THREAT, ANY WEAPONS SYSTEM THAT IN FACT IS ACQUIRED BY THE ROC MUST BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF COUNTERING A REAL PRC THREAT.

--ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THAT ACQUISITION OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS SYSTEMS BY THE ROC COULD BE PERCEIVED BY THE PRC AS A THREAT TO THEM, WE MUST NEVERTHELESS ADVOCATE RELEASE OF SUCH WEAPONS TO THE ROC WHEN THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS FOR DOING SO. ACCORDINGLY, WHEN THERE ARE NO OTHER REASONABLE OR COST-EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
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COUNTERING A REAL PRC THREAT, OR WHEN ABSENCE OF SUCH A WEAPONS SYSTEM CASTS REAL DOUBT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ROC DETERRENT, HIGH TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED.

--WE SHOULD GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRC INITIATIVE TO EFFECT A BLOCKADE/EMBARGO OF ROC PORTS. SUCH A MEASURE IS WITHIN PRC CAPABILITIES.

6. PART TWO: WEAPONS SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS: FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR NEAR TERM ROC WEAPONS SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN MADE BY COUNTRY TEAM'S SECURITY COMMITTEE (COMUSTDC: CHIEF MAAG, COMMANDER 327TH AD, DIRECTOR ATG, DCM AND POLCOUS, UNDER AMBASSADOR'S CHAIRMANSHIP) AND IS INTENDED TO PLACE GROG

ACQUISITION REQUESTS IN BETTER PERSPECTIVE AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEFENSE DOCTRINE DEVELOPED ABOVE. THE SYSTEMS WE RECOMMEND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE POM AND JSOP REQUIREMENTS AND FIT WITH THE US PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN AND PESCADORES UNDER THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY. THEY ARE BASICALLY DEFENSIVE, COST EFFECTIVE, AND NOT HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE, YET THEY GIVE THE ROC MILITARY A MUCH MORE CREDIBLE DETERRENT POSTURE THAN IT ENJOYS TODAY.

7. GROC PROVIDES A RELATIVELY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THEIR NATIONAL BUDGET TO DEFENSE, BUT LIMITATIONS ON THEIR INVESTMENT CAPITAL AND FMS CREDIT STILL LIMIT THEM TO VERY FEW MAJOR ACQUISITIONS. THEY HAVE, AT OUR RECOMMENDATION, STARTED A MILITARY FIVE YEAR PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING CYCLE, THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY KNOW COST AND AVAILABILITY OF US SYSTEMS. OUR PRIORITY IS GIVEN TO THE AIR DEFENSE OF TAIWAN AND PESCADORES PLUS NAVAL POINT DEFENSE AND ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE.

8. MISSION: AIR DEFENSE OF TAIWAN. AIR DEFENSE MISSION IS RECEIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION WITH THE 100 F-5E CO-ASSEMBLY/COPRODUCTION PROGRAM. THIS WILL PROVIDE TWO WINGS OF MODERN AIRCRAFT BY LATE 77. IT WOULD BE TIMELY AND COST EFFECTIVE TO REPLACE TWO OF THE OTHER THREE FIGHTER WINGS NOW EQUIPPED WITH F-104 AND F-100 AIRCRAFT WITH F-5E/F IN 77-80 TIME FRAME. WE RECOMMEND
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A MIX OF ABOUT 75 F-5E AND 25 F-5F. THE TWO PLACE F-5F CONFIGURATION AFFORDS MAJOR TRAINING ADVANTAGES IN ADDITION TO FLYING SAFETY ON NIGHT AIR-TO-SURFACE CLOSE SUPPORT MISSIONS. TO AVOID DISRUPTING THE CO-ASSEMBLY/COPRODUCTION BEYOND THE PROGRAMMED 100 AIRCRAFT NORTHROP WANTS A COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE BY LATE NOVEMBER. WE ADVOCATE A CONTINUING F-5E/F PROGRAM AT THREE OR FOUR AIRCRAFT PER MONTH WITHOUT FMS CREDIT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH US/ROC MOU, USG APPROVAL IS NECESSARY. WE KNOW OF NO NORTHROP PROPOSALS FOR THIRD COUNTRY PRODUCTION OR FOR SUBCONTRACTING USING THE TAICHUNG FACILITIES. IF THE ROC WANT THE F-5F, NORTHROP IS CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL TO TRADE A LIKE NUMBER OF F MODEL FORWARD FUSELAGES FROM US PRODUCTION FOR F-5E FORWARD FUSELAGES CONSTRUCTED IN TAICHUNG.

9. WE UNDERSTAND THE AVAILABILITY OF A NEW AIR COMBAT FIGHTER ACFT, AN OUTGROWTH OF THE YF-16/17 LIGHT WEIGHT FIGHTER IS NOT FORECAST FOR OUR ALLIES BEFORE LATE 1981.

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REPLACEMENT OF THE FIFTH WING CURRENTLY EQUIPPED WITH F-5A OR ANY SHORTFALL WOULD THEN BE TIMELY. GROC WILL EVENTUALLY BUY COMPONENTS TO UPGRADE THEIR AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL BUT THIS DOES NOT INTRODUCE A NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT REQUIRE USG APPROVAL.

10. THE GROC RECENTLY WAS CLEARED TO CONVERT THE BASIC HAWK BATTALION TO IMPROVED HAWK. THIS CONVERSION WILL START IN ABOUT TWO YEARS. THE HAWK BATTALION COVERS ONLY THE NORTHERN HALF OF TAIWAN. CONVERSION SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY PROCUREMENT OF IMPROVED HAWK BATTALION TO COVER THE SOUTHERN HALF.

11. ROC NAVY ANTIAIRCRAFT POINT DEFENSE IS WEAK. FOUR DESTROYERS ARE BEING EQUIPPED WITH SEA CHAPPARAL AND THE PROPOSED PATROL SHIP MULTIMISSION WILL HAVE A GOOD AIR

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DEFENSE SYSTEM. FURTHER PROCUREMENT OF CHAPPARAL WILL DEPEND ON SUCCESSFUL UPGRADING OF THAT MISSILE'S CAPABILITY. OTHERWISE, THE ROC NAVY WILL NEED BETTER ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS ON THEIR COMBAT SHIPS. THE ARMY AND MARINES NEED BETTER ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY. A VERSION OF THE VULCAN 20 MM SYSTEM WOULD BE A SOUND INVESTMENT. THE ROC MANUFACTURE 20 MM AMMUNITION AND HAVE A MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY DERIVED FROM THE USE OF A SIMILAR GUN IN THEIR F-104 AIRCRAFT.

12. MISSION: DEFENSE AGAINST SEABORN INVASION:
GROC HAS USG CLEARANCE TO ACQUIRE FIVE PATROL SHIPS MULTIMISSILE (PSMM). THESE WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH MODERN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. PSMM WITH MISSILES WOULD COUNTER THREAT OF STYX MISSILE-EQUIPPED PRC SHIPS. GROC STRONGLY DESIRES TO EQUIP THE PSMM WITH HARPOON SSM. GROC ALSO ENVISIONS USE OF HARPOON IN SHORE BATTERIES ON TAIWAN AND FISCADORES AND POSSIBLE RETROFIT OF SOME DESTROYERS. MISSION SECURITY COMMITTEE HAS STRONGLY ENDORSED GROC REQUEST FOR HARPOON IN TAIPEI 3345 AND 5283. GROC RECENTLY ADVISED US NEGOTIATIONS WITH TACOMA BOAT ARE AT A STAND STILL PENDING CLEARANCE FOR HARPOON MISSILE. IF HARPOON IS NOT RELEASED, INDICATIONS ARE GROC WILL ATTEMPT TO BUY ITALIAN OTOMAT MISSILE. PSMM HAS LITTLE VALUE WITHOUT MISSILE ARMAMENT. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND ASSURANCE TO GROC THAT IT CAN BUY HARPOON MISSILE.

13. ROCAF CLOSE SUPPORT OF ROCN UNITS EXPOSED TO PRC STYX MISSILE-EQUIPPED SHIPS HAS RESULTED IN CONCERTED ROCAF NIGHT AIR-TO-SURFACE WEAPONS DELIVERY TRAINING IN TAIWAN STRAITS. TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS AND REDUCE CONSIDERABLE ASSOCIATED FLYING HAZARDS, ROCAF NEED CLEARANCE TO PROCURE BASIC LASER TECHNOLOGY. FLARE SHIP, EITHER C-119 OR TWO PLACE FIGHTER WOULD LASER DESIGNATE TARGET AND MK-82 500 POUND BOMBS WITH LASER GUIDANCE KIT WOULD BE DELIVERED FROM FIGHTERS AT RELATIVELY SAFE ALTITUDES. ROCAF POSSESS FEW AIR-TO-SURFACE DELIVERY WEAPONS SUITABLE FOR F-5 DELIVERY. SELECTIVE USE OF LASER GUIDED WEAPONS AGAINST AN INVASION FLEET WOULD PROVE HIGHLY COST EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING SORTIES REQUIRED PER TARGET AND WOULD ALSO REDUCE LARGE OUTLAY FOR PURCHASE AND
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STORAGE OF UNGUIDED BOMBS. ACCORDINGLY, WE RECOMMEND LIMITED PROCUREMENT FOR TRAINING AND EMERGENCY USE. WE DO NOT ADVOCATE USG RELEASE OF MORE SOPHISTICATED AND HIGHER TECHNOLOGY BOMB SYSTEMS.

14. WE ARE INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY OF UP-GUNNING ROC SIDE-FIRING C-119 AIRCRAFT NOW EQUIPPED WITH 50 CALIBER GUNS. GUNSHIP TECHNOLOGY IS WELL DEVELOPED AND PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE TO NIGHT DEFENSIVE MISSION.

15. MISSION: TRAINING TO COUNTER PRC SUBMARINE THREAT: THE TO ROC DIESEL POWERED SUBMARINES RECENTLY ACQUIRED ALREADY ARE PROVIDING MUCH NEEDED ASW TRAINING TO ROCN AND FREQUENTLY TO US NAVAL UNITS OPERATING NEAR TAIWAN AS WELL. ROC SUBMARINE AVAILABILITY WILL BE VERY LIMITED WHEN ONE OR THE TWO GOES INTO OVERHAUL FOR TEN-MONTH PERIOD BEGINNING MARCH 1975. MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING ON THE OTHER SUBMARINE REDUCES AVAILABILITY OF SUBMARINE SEA TIME FOR ASW TRAINING SERVICES TO ABOUT 25 PERCENT PLANNING FACTOR. AN ADDITIONAL SUBMARINE WOULD PROVIDE MINIMUM 50 PERCENT FACTOR AS THREE-YEAR SUBMARINE OVERHAUL REQUIREMENT WAS PHASED INTO ROCN'S LONG-RANGE MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND ROCN ACQUISITION OF THIR GUPPY II SUBMARINE TO PROVIDE CONSISTENT ASW TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE. CAPITAL INVESTMENT ALREADY UNDERTAKEN IN SUBMARINE PROGRAM WILL SUPPORT ADDITIONAL SUBMARINE WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE ADDITIONAL OUTLAY.

16. OUR THREAT ANALYSIS INDICATES SEA BLOCKADE OF TAIWAN BY PROC SUBMARINE PATROL AS HIGH PROBABILITY IN ANY CONFRONTATION OR ATTEMPT AT ISOLATION. EVEN IN EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, WE DO NOT BELIEVE GROC WOULD ATTEMPT TO USE ITS MINISCULE SUBMARINE FORCE IN AN AGGRESSIVE ROLE, THOUGH IT WOULD HAVE AN ASW DETECTION CAPABILITY. USG CAN DECIDE AT SOME FUTURE TIME WHETHER IT IS PRUDENT TO EQUIP THE SUBMARINES WITH SOME CREDIBLE ASW DETERRENT ARMAMENT. AT PRESENT THE SUBMARINES OPERATE ENTIRELY IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS WITHOUT ANY CAPABILITY OF SELF-DEFENSE WEAPONRY.

17. A ROC REQUEST FOR THE SALE OF S2E AIRCRAFT TO REPLACE
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THE OBSOLESCE S2A IS AWAITING WASHINGTON APPROVAL. THIS IS A VALID ASW REQUIREMENT. THE ROCAF S2A SYSTEM IS OBSOLETE AND NO LONGER LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTABLE. THE 12 S2E AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH MISSION CAPABLE SENSORS WILL PROVIDE A LONG-TERM COST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM.

18. USE OF FIXED PASSIVE HYDROPHONE ARRAY AND OTHER SENSORS TO MONITOR SEALANES AND APPROACHES TO THEIR PRINCIPAL HARBORS IS ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION.

19. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: IN THE PAST ROC HAVE BEEN

ENTHUSIASTIC COMPETITORS FOR OLD EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES SOLD AT BARGAIN PRICES. THEIR OVERHAUL AND REBUILD CAPABILITY ENABLED USEFUL ASSIMILATION OF SHIPS, ARMOR, VEHICLES, AND ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT; THEN THEY CONVERT MUCH OF THE RESIDUAL INTO NEEDED SCRAP. HOWEVER, OLD COMPLEX SYSTEMS HAVE OVERTAXED THE ROC OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET AND READINESS IS DETERIORATING AS SYSTEMS BECOME UNSUPPORTABLE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR FAR GREATER DISCRIMINATION IN PROCUREMENT, STANDARDIZATION, AND THE ACQUISITION OF NEW US EQUIPMENT KEYED TO A RESPONSIVE U.S. LOGISTICAL BASE, SOME ROC MILITARY ARE STILL INCLINED TO ACQUIRE SOME NEW SYSTEMS WHICH HAVE LOW PRIORITY IN THEIR DEFENSIVE MISSION. CURRENT EXAMPLES ARE THE TOW ANTITANK MISSILE AND MORE TANKS. THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE RECOMMENDED AGAINST TOW BUT THE PREMIER ACQUIESCED TO ROC ARMY PRESSURE AND AGREED TO SUPPORT LIMITED PROCUREMENT. THE ARMY NEEDS A FEW TANK RECOVERY VEHICLES TO SUPPORT THEIR RECENT BUY OF 160 M-48 TANKS, BUT FURTHER TANK ACQUISITION HAS A LOW PRIORITY. WE CONTINUE TO URGE CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION IN THE ROC ARMY WHICH WOULD REDUCE PERSONNEL COSTS AND FREE MANPOWER FOR NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. ROC ARMY IS FAR BEHIND THEIR AIR FORCE AND NAVY IN ESTABLISHING A MODERN LOGISTICS SYSTEM. ARMY MANAGEMENT AND THEIR TECHNICAL TRAINING DEFICIENCIES ARE VERY SIGNIFICANT. MUCH MAAG ATTENTION IS BEING FORUSED ON THEIR CURRENT ARMY PROBLEMS. THE ROC ARMY IS RELATIVELY WELL-EQUIPPED IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE SO MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS, OTHER THAN THE STATED POINT AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENT, ARE NOT TIMELY.

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20. US MISSION SECURITY COMMITTEE SHOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS A VIEW ON ALL MAJOR ROC FMS SALES REQUESTS FOR NEW SYSTEMS. THERE HAVE BEEN ROC ATTEMPTS TO BYPASS THE US MISSION ON MILITARY SALES NOT INVOLVING CREDIT BY HAVING CONTRACTORS AND THEIR PROCUREMENT MISSION IN WASHINGTON WORK DIRECTLY WITH USG DEPARTMENTS ON FMS. THEY SAY US CONTRACTORS ARE OFTEN BETTER ABLE TO GET WASHINGTON APPROVAL. ROC ALSO TAKE THIS ROUTE WHEN THEY LACK US MISSION SUPPORT. EVEN IF THE SYSTEM BEING SOUGHT IS DEFENSIVE, NEVERTHELESS IT MAY IMPACT ADVERSELY ON SENSITIVE U.S. ACTIVITIES IN TAIWAN, MAY BE A SYSTEM WITH LITTLE PRIORITY AND THE SALE WOULD DIVERT RESOURCES FROM VALID NEEDS, OR IT MAY NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THIS THEATER.

21. IN SUMMARY, WE SEEK USG CONCURRENCE ON A NEAR TERM DEFENSE PACKAGE WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ROC AND U.S. A BASIS

FOR SOUND DEFENSE PLANNING. THE US MILITARY AGENCIES IN
ROC HAVE COMPLETED STUDIES AND OUR ONGOING ASSESSMENTS
INDICATE ACQUISITION CLEARANCE FOR THESE SYSTEMS WILL ALSO
CHANNEL THINKING TO THE DESIRED DEFENSIVE POSTURE. WE
RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR CAREFUL WASHINGTON EVALUATION OF
ROC DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, BUT HOPE THIS US MISSION
SECURITY COMMITTEE ASSESSMENT WILL BE A USEFUL BLUEPRINT
AND FACILITATE COORDINATION. WE BELIEVE THE SPECIFIC SYSTEMS
RECOMMENDED HERE ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE
CRITERIA OF PART I AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH OVERALL US
POLICY INTERESTS.

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